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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's
May 30, 2003 tentative finding that the Respondent Kirk S. DeMille is permanently
and totally disabled. The Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction to hear this case is
disputed; however, if this Court does have jurisdiction it arises pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A2-801 (8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review this appeal?
Standard of Review: This is a question of law where appellate review is under
a "correctness" standard with no deference to the agency's determination, because
the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d
177, 182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated,
§63-46b-16(4)(d)(1988).
Issue 2: Did the Utah Labor Commission correctly determine that Mr. DeMille
has a "significant impairment under Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-413 (1997).
Standard of Review: This is a question of law as it involves a matter of
statutory interpretation. Appellate review is under a "correctness" standard with no
deference to the agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power
and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the
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jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988).
The Utah State Legislature has granted the Labor Commission "the full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law. . ." to any
adjudicative proceeding before it. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). When "the
governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion to [an agency, the appellate
court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and may only overturn the
[agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and irrational." Bernard v.
Motor Vehicle Division. 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah App. 1995).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the
Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051,
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah
1977).
Issue 3: Did the Utah Labor Commission correctly determine that Mr. DeMille
September 14,1995 industrial accident was the "direct cause" of his permanent total
disability under Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-413?
Standard of Review: This involves a mixed question. The interpretation of the
term "direct causation" is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed
under a "correctness" standard with no deference to the agency's determination,
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because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission.
939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988).
Review of the Commission's underlying factual findings regarding direct
causation is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Chase v. Industrial
Commission. 872 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1994).
As in issue 2 above, the statute is to be liberally construed and any doubt as
to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. E.g., State Tax
Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); and
McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977).
Issue 4: Did Mr. DeMille meet his burden of proving that his industrial accident
at Thurston Cable is the medical cause of his low back condition?
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of law and fact to which this
Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determination "with
varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of 'correctness and
a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d
182 (Utah 1977).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the
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Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051,
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah
1977).
Preservation for Appeal: All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner
before the Utah Labor Commission with the exception of whether this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413 (1997) is the applicable permanent total
disability statute, and R612-1-10 of the Utah Administrative Code is the applicable
Permanent Total Disability Rule. R612-1-10(C)(1)(c) is the applicable Rule as to
"finality" of Labor Commission Orders. The Statutes and Rules are set forth in full
in Addendum "A" hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

The Petitioners seek review of the Utah Labor

Commission's Order tentatively finding Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled
as a result of work related injuries.
Course of Proceedings: Mr. DeMille filed an Application for Permanent Total
Disability benefits sustained as the result of an industrial injury on September 14,
1995. (R1 at 19). The Employer and its workers compensation Carrier filed an
Answer to the Application on April 30,1999. (R1 at 40-43) and an Amended Answer
on September 7,1999 (R1 at 47-48). Notice of Hearing was sent to all parties on
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February 12, 2001 setting Mr. DeMille's claim for Hearing on April 4, 2001. (R1 at
48). The Hearing was subsequently continued and after further discovery
proceedings were conducted, a new Notice of Formal Hearing setting the claim for
Hearing on April 3, 2001 was sent to all parties. (R1 at 53).
On November 6, 2002 Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse
entered his Findings fo Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order granting Petitioner's
claim for permanent total disability benefits. (R1 at 165-181). Addendum "B".
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on
December 6, 2002 (R1 at 185-188). The Commission entered an Order Denying
Petitioner's Motion for Review on May 30, 2003. (R1 at 222-225). Addendum "C".
A Petition for Review was filed with this Court on June 27,2003. A Docketing
statement was filed on August 5, 2003.
On December 15, 2003 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack for
Jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a Response on December 31, 2003 and Mr. DeMille
filed a Reply to that Response on January 16,2004. On January 27,2004 the Court
of Appeals issued an Order deferring the jurisdictional Motion to Dismiss for Briefing.
On March 11, 2004, Respondent filed a Second Motion to Dismiss alleging
recently decided authority which further supported it's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner
filed a Response and on April 27,2004 the Court of Appeals again issued an Order
deferring the jurisdictional issues.
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple,
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straightforward and not really disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed and
largely unchallenged statement of facts is contained in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge, dated November
6,2002 (R1 at 165-181). See also. Addendum "B". The Commission in it's Order
Denying Motion for Review dated May 30, 2003, adopted those Findings. (R1 at
222-225); See ajso, Addendum "C".
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Order from which Petitioner seeks appellate review is not a "final Order
which is subject to appellate review. It is a Tentative Finding of Permanent Total
Disability and the Administrative Law Judge has not yet fully adjudicated this matter.
Petitioner's Petition for Review is premature and this Court is without jurisdiction to
review the Order as it presently stands.
Even if the Order is subject to appellate review, Petitioner has failed to
marshal the facts and evidence in support of the Order and the Petition should be
dismissed for that reason as well. In any event Respondent did meet his burden to
establish that his industrial accident was the direct cause of his present Permanent
Total Disability status.

ARGUMENT
I
INITIAL TENTATIVE FINDINGS OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY ARE
NOT FINAL APPEALABLE ORDERS.
6

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), the Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction over the Commission's "final" adjudicative Orders. It is
acknowledged that the Administrative Law Judge's Order and the Commission's
Order on Motion for Review were only "tentative" findings of permanent total
disability. On this basis Respondent previously moved this Court to dismiss the
Petition for Review as the underlying Order was not a final Order subject to judicial
review. The Court reserved the issue directing the parties to Brief it.
On January 30, 2004, three days after that Order was issued by this Court,
the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Thomas v. Color Country
Management. 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201. That case involved the "finality" of an
initial finding of permanent total disability by the Utah Labor Commission and
whether such Orders were "final" for the purpose of enforcement and appellate
review, the very issue this Court indicated it needed further briefing in order to
resolve.
The Supreme Court in Thomas specifically held as follows:
Section 34A-2-413 (6) (a) specifically states that initial findings
of permanent total disability are not final, ibjd at 9.
*****

While sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 of the Labor Code set
forth a broad definition of what constitutes a final order, the language
of section 34A-2-413 excepts the initial finding of permanent total
disability from this broad definition of "final order" by expressly stating
that the initial, tentative finding is not final, ibid at 11.

In this case, like Thomas, only the interim, tentative finding of permanent total
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disability has been made. Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Thomas such Orders are not final for purposes of appeal.
Additionally, this Court in Sloan v. Board of Review. 781 P.2d 463,465 (Utah
App. 1989), held that "Because the order reserves something further for the agency
to determine, we hold that the order of the commission is not a final appealable
order."
In further support of this argument, it should be noted that the Order appealed
from in this case had not been designated by the Labor Commission as "final" for
purposes of appellate review as such language is conspicuously missing from the
Order below. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1)(f) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12
(6)(c)(vii) (1988) require that final and thus appealable Orders of Administrative
Agencies contain language putting the parties on notice that the Order is final and
appealable.
Finally, although Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(C)(1 )(c) does provide that
a preliminary determination of permanent total disability is final agency action for
purposes of appellate review, that Administrative Rule adopted by the Commission,
can not overcome a clearly contrary State statute and a final decision of the Utah
Court of Appeal. It is improper rule making and can not serve to confer jurisdiction
upon this Court.
Petitioners argue that Utah Administrative Code R612-1-10(c)(1)(c), adopted
after the Thomas decision, specifically provides that "preliminary determinations of
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after the Thomas decision, specifically provides that "preliminary determinations of
permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final
agency action for purposes of appellate judicial review". This argument is flawed for
several reasons.
First, it is well established that an injured worker, like Petitioner herein, is
entitled to the law as it existed at the time of his injury. Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Industrial Commission. 704 P.2d 1168,1171 f.n.1 (Utah 1985). Utah Const. Co. v.
Matheson. 534 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1975). Oakland Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission. 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974). Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission. 268 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1954).

Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial

Commission. 740 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987). Moore v. American Coal Co.. 737
P.2d 789 (Utah 1987). Lantham Co. v. Industrial Commission. 717 P.2d 255, 256
at f.n.1 (Utah 1986). The Administrative Rule cited by Petitioners was not in effect
at the time of Respondent Kirk DeMillie's injury or even at the time of the filling of his
Application for Hearing.
Second, the Rule is a gross abuse of Administrative Rule Making.
Administrative Agencies only have authority to set out procedural directives within
their purview. In this case, the definition of what constitutes a "final" Order from the
Labor Commission is not a procedural directive.

The Utah Legislature, as

specifically found in Thomas, stated that "Section 34A-2-413 (6) (a) specifically
states that initial findings of permanent total disability are not final."
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through Administrative Rulemaking to overturn a specific Statute adopted by the
Utah State Legislature and overrule the Utah Supreme Court in interpreting that
Statute. It is at best a blatant attempt by an executive administrative agency, with
quasi-judicial authority to overrule the Utah State Legislature and the Utah Supreme
Court.

The Labor Commission, as an Administrative Agency can not create

appellate jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist.
In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission. 2005 UT App. 70 (February 17,
2005) this Court held that:
The administrative rule conflicts with the statute.
An
administrative body's rules must conform to, rather than be
inconsistent, with statute. See Bradshaw v. Wilkinson Water Co.. 2004
UT 38, H33,94 P.3d 242. The rule must, therefore, yield to the statute.
An interim order of permanent total disability is not final and appealable
until the requirements of Utah Code section 34A-2-413 (6) (b) are met.
id-71.
This Court has recently issued an opinion in the case of Ameritemps. Inc. v.
Labor Commission. 2005 UT App. 491 (November 10,2005). In that case, the Court
found the Labor Commission's "preliminary determination of permanent total
disability is a seriatim final agency action, and this court does have subject matter
jurisdiction to review it." 1J32. The Court in Ameritemps applied the three-part test
in Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 999 P. 2d 17,21 (Utah 2000),
to determine if an agency action is final:
(1) Has the administrative decision making reached a stage where
judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?
(2)

Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal
10

(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal
consequences flow form the agency action?; and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary,
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent
agency action?
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication.
The Court in Ameritemps relies heavily on the fact that the Labor
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review in that case contained statutorily
mandated "Notice of Appeal Rights" which indicated that a party could request
reconsideration within twenty days of the date or the order, or within thirty days of the
date of the Order, Petition this Court for judicial review of the Order.
The Order Denying Motion for Review (R1 at 222-225) in Mr. DeMille's case
significantly did not contain the statutorily mandated "Notice of Appeal Rights"
because it was not a "final agency action" from which an appeal could be taken. The
Labor Commission had issued an Order of Remand to the ALJ "... to complete the
adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation and
also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. DeMille's counsel." (R1 at 224).
Judicial review of this case did in fact disrupt the orderly process of
adjudication. Although the Commission had issued an Order of Remand, they
unofficially imposed a stay on all proceedings in this matter while the appeal was
being taken. No request for stay was made by either party and no bond was ever
posted by the Petitioners. Nevertheless, the Labor Commission refused to set the
case for further Hearings to "complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMillie's claim for
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permanent total disability compensation."
Additionally, although statutorily mandated subsistence payments had been
ordered by the ALJ and the Labor Commission, the Petitioners have not made any
payments since filing their Petition for Review in this case over two years ago. By
any measure, the appeal in this case of the preliminary determination of Permanent
Total Disability has significantly disrupted the orderly process of adjudication.
B. Rights or Obligations Determined.
This Court in Ameritemps found that the second-prong had been met because
"the Board had determined that Albert [the injured worker] was permanently totally
disabled and also awarded permanent total disability compensation payments to
Albert to start immediately." fl 21. The Court quoted with approval Baker v. Utah
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 970 P.2d 702,706 (Utah 1998) that an agency action was final
where "the language of the order makes clear that the [agency] determined
obligations of the parties with which the parties must immediately comply."
The second-prong is not satisfied in this case, because although the
Commission directed subsistence benefits to be paid, the Petitioners have never
made any such payments, sought a stay on that obligation or posted an Appeal
Bond. It is unjust and inequitable for the Petitioners to seek judicial review on the
basis of an obligation that they have not paid or sought a stay from. By failing to
make the ordered payments while this case was under review, or obtaining an stay
on appeal and posting a bond, Petitioners have forfeited the right to invoke this
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Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that rights or obligations have been
determined in the Order Denying Motion for Review.
In this regard, it is important to note that the Legislature has specifically
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (6) that:
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not
final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment
activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker
Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative
law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation
provider reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful
employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan. (Emphasis added).
By the very terms of the applicable statute the Order Denying Motion for
Review/Order of Remand in this case was not a final agency action which could
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court.
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural or Intermediate.
The third-prong requires that the agency action from which the Petition for
Review is taken not be preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with
regard to subsequent agency action. It is impossible to view the Order in this case
as anything but preliminary, preparatory and intermediate. The Commission was
specific that it was making only a "tentative determination" of permanent total
disability. (R1 at 224). Further, the Commission specifically issued an Order of
Remand in order "to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim," which is
13

additional evidence that the Order was preliminary and an intermediate step in the
permanent total disability process, since the Employer/Carrier would still be given
the opportunity to present a reemployment plan which would demonstrate that Mr.
DeMille was in fact not permanently totally disabled.
For all of the above reasons, the Order Denying Motion for Review/Order of
Remand in this case was not a final agency action from which a Petition for Review
could be taken. This Court should decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
this case, and remand it back to the Labor Commission for further adjudicative
proceedings.
II
MR. DEMILLE SATISFIED HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
HIS PERMEANT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUS WAS THE DIRECT
RESULT OF HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
A. The Facts and the Law are to be Liberally Construed in Favor of
Granting Compensation to Injured Workers.
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990);
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v.
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d
14

613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M&
K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the
Act, and stated as follows:
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice.'
* * * * * *

In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for
injuries to ^employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act,
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him,
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents,
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise.
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in
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favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. Jd. at
1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
The Labor Commission affirmed the Findings, Conclusions and determinations
of the Administrative Law Judge. The Administrative Law Judge in rendering his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law properly applied this vital rule of
construction. His Findings and Conclusions evidence a "liberal construction" and
"resolution of doubt in favor of the claim".
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved
in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. Petitioner totally
disregards and ignores these well founded and detailed Findings, and instead asks
this Court to construe the facts in a light most favorable to the insurance company
and the defeating of benefits. In short, they completely disregard this underlying and
fundamental principle of Utah Workers' Compensation law.
B. Petitioner Failed to Marshall the Evidence in Support of the Order.
If Petitioner wishes to challenge Findings of Fact, it is required to marshal all
of the evidence supporting the Agency's finding and show that, despite supporting
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. Hales Sand and
Granite. Inc. v. Audit Division. 842 P.2d 887,893 (Utah 1992). It has failed to do so.
Petitioner failed to even mention significant Findings made by the Administrative
Law Judge and the Commission.
Those omitted Findings are pointed out in Respondent's Statement of Facts
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above.
As a result of Petitioner's failure to adequately marshal the facts and evidence
it's Petition for Review should be dismissed.. To rule otherwise would allow any
party on appeal to supplant Findings of the lower Court with that parties' own
purported Findings without marshaling evidence or meeting the substantial evidence
test.
C. The Commission Correctly Concluded that Mr. DeMille had a
"Significant Impairment" as that Term is Used in the Permanent Total Disability
Statute.
In order to be entitled to a finding of permanent total disability, the worker must
prove a "compensable industrial injury" occurred, and that he has suffered some
percentage of impairment. A finding of permanent total disability is appropriate
when even a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial
accident combined with other factors renders the Claimant unable to obtain
employment. Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission. 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App.
1989).
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-102(8) (2000) defined "impairment" as a" a purely
medical condition reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss.
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial."
There can be little question that Mr. DeMille sustained a "significant" impairment as
a result of his 1995 industrial accident. Prior to that time, despite a preexisting 17%
whole person impairment which was relatively asymptomatic, Mr. DeMille was able
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to work.
This is another area where the Petitioners have failed in their duty to marshal
the evidence. The ALJ found and the Labor Commission concurred that "But for Mr.
DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he likely would have continued
relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period." (R1 at 178). The
medical records reflect, and the Labor Commission found, that Mr. DeMille's
accident at Thurston on September 14,1995,"... produced scarring in muscle, spine
and soft tissue, resulting in both anatomical and functional abnormality and loss."
(R1 at 223). The ALJ specifically found that "[T]he respondents'(Petitioner's herein)
interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in serious permanent
exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems." (R1 at 178).
The Petitioner's make much of the fact that Mr. DeMille's impairment cannot
be considered significant because it has never been rated by a physician. Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-413(1)(b)(l) only requires a "significant impairment," not a
"significant impairment rating." The significance of Mr. DeMille's impairment is
reflected in the fact that Mr. DeMille's injuries caused by the 1995 industrial accident
took him from employability with a preexisting 17% whole person impairment to
permanent total disability.
D. The Commission Correctly Determined that Mr. DeMille's September
14, 1995 industrial Injury was the Direct Cause of his Permanent Total
Disability.
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413 (1)(b)(iii) provides that:
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(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation,
the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of
evidence that:
(i)
the employee sustained a significant impairment or
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident
or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total
disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(Hi) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the
direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability.
(Emphasis added).
Mr. DeMille does not take issue with Thurston Cable's definition of the term
"direct cause" as "generally synonymous with the terms 'primary cause', 'real cause",
"prepondering cause' and even 'proximate cause'" (Respondent's Brief at 28 and
cases cited therein).
In this case it is clear that Mr. DeMille had prior injuries to his back. That is
not unusual for an employee of his age and with his work history. He did in fact
already have a 17% whole person impairment for his low back prior to his
September 14,1995 industrial accident. (R1 at 122). Despite those limitations Mr.
DeMille was able to perform his job functions with Thurston Cable and remained
gainfully employed. (R1 at 222-23).
Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims appointed a Medical Panel
comprised of Dr. Madison Thomas, neurologist and Dr. Glen Momberger, an
othorpedic surgeon. On June 19, 1997 the Panel issued its Report. (R3 at 436441). In relevance here, the Panel specifically found as follows:
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Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems
would undoubtedly been made less severe, but likewise had it not been
for the significant injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely
have continued relatively asymptomatic for an indefinate period. Since
the more recent injury produced a significant aggravation of the back
problem, the panel will leave it to the ALJ to determine the legal
responsibility for further treatment of the condition. (R3 at 440).
There is no evidence in the record that Thurston Cable filed any Objection to
the Medical Panel Report, despite the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601
(2002). In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the report of the Medical Panel and
found that on September 14,1995, Mr. DeMille in fact injured his low back and left
leg when he fell off a front-end loader.
Thurston Cable assembled a consultative Medical Panel composed of
neurologists Dr. Moress and Dr. Scott Knorp. On October 26, 1999, that Panel
essentially corroborated the conclusions reached by the Medical Panel. (R3 at 400).
Judge La Jeunesse specifically found that:
Judge Sims' 1997 Order conclusively confirmed that the 1995 industrial
accident caused Mr. DeMille some back and left leg problems contrary
to the opinions rendered by the respondents' medical penels. The
preponderance of the medical evidence established that Mr. DeMille
suffered ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy in part due to
permanent aggravations caused by the 1995 accident. The undisputed
medical evidence in the case verified that Mr. DeMille also suffered
some spinal, soft tissue damage from infections accompanying the
stimulator implant. No dispute existed that Freemont Comp's
requirement of a two stage procedure for the stimulator implant caused
Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the stimulator. (R1 at
25).
The Labor Commission in its Order Denying Motions for Review/Remand
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specifically found that:
Thurston's second argument is that Mr. DeMille failed to meet
§34A-2-413(1)(b)(iii)'s requirement that 'the industrial accident... was
the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability." In
considering this argument, the Commission notes Mr. DeMille was able
to work prior to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident the
resulting injuries and consequences of medical treatment left him
unable to work, except for relatively short and unsuccessful efforts to
rejoin the workforce. Mr. DeMille's inability to work as a result of the
Thurston accident is confirmed by the medical evidence. Thus, Mr.
DeMille's accident at Thurston is the direct cause of his permanent total
disability. (R1 at 223-24).
The overwhelming weight of the undisputed evidence is that Mr. DeMille's
1995 industrial injury was the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
Petitioners in their Statement of Facts omit the significant medical evidence cited
above, and thus they again fail in their duty to marshal the evidence.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Order below from which Petitioner seeks judicial review is not a final
Order and is thus not subject to judicial review. Petitioner has failed to marshal the
facts and evidence in support of the award; however, the overwhelming weight of the
facts and evidence demonstrate that Mr. DeMille was in fact entitled to a tentative
Finding of Permanent Total Disability.
Respondent respectfully requests that the tentative Finding of Permanent Total
Disability be upheld and that this matter be remanded to the Administrative Law
Judge to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total
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disability compensation, and also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr.
DeMille's counsel.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2005.
DABN

Virginius Dabney
Counse for Kirk S. Demille

I
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the member. This Subsection (5) does not apply to the items
listed in Subsection (4)(b)(iv).
(6) (a) For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident t h a t is not otherwise provided for in the
schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial
disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission based on the medical evidence.
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in
Subsection (6Xa) shall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in
this section.
(c) Permanent partial disability compensation may
not:
(i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the
period of compensation for permanent total loss of
bodily function; and
(ii) be paid for any permanent impairment t h a t
existed prior to an industrial accident.
(7) The amounts specified in this section are all subject to
the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as
specified in this section, and in no event shall more t h a n a
maximum of 66-V3% of the state average weekly wage a t the
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
1997
34A-2-413. P e r m a n e n t total disability — A m o u n t of
p a y m e n t s — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from
an industrial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b) TD establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee h a s the burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease t h a t gives
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled;
and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent
total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled,
the commission shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments t h a t limit the employee's ability
to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of
the work activities for which the employee has been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease t h a t is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability
benefits other than those provided under this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant,
may be presented to the commission, but is not binding
and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this
chapter and Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act.
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(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-'%% of
the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more t h a n 85%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plu s
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2Xa)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly
compensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or
before J u n e 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all
remaining permanent total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or
Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or
after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future
liability paid before'or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after
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an employee has received compensation from the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced,
to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by
the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6Xa)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or
medical benefits due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given,
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection
(6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the
plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education,
medical and disability compensation benefits, job
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable
disability compensation to provide for the employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge on the administrative law
judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paicl
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the
employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the
facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
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(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may not be reguired to the extent that it would
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability
benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess
of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate,
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained
in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding
the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate parttime work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job
that would require the employee to undertake work
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual
functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate,
part-time employment has been offered but the employee
has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent
partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes,
or any combination of two such body members constitutes
total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent totaf disability pursuant to
Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility
to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than
once every three years after an award is final, unless good
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cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical
evaluations;
(Hi) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax
Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or
questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at
the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, a n insurer or self-insured employer may
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing
on t h a t issue. The petition shall be accompanied by
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer
permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (HXfXi) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall
adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the
employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other
evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total
disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation
benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
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34A-2-414. Benefits in c a s e of d e a t h — Distribution of
award to d e p e n d e n t s — D e a t h of d e p e n d e n t s
— Remarriage of surviving s p o u s e .
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of
all the dependents, as may be determined by a n administrative law judge.
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the
benefits among the dependents in the manner t h a t the
administrative law judge considers just and equitable.
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper,
and shall operate to discharge all other claims.
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid,
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the
administrative law judge.
(3) In all cases of death when:
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviving spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudication on behalf of t h a t individual and the minor children;
and
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application
shall be made by the guardian or next friend of the minor
dependents.
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of
protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents
the administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so,
provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor
dependents.
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die during the period covered by weekly payments authorized by this
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act, shall cease.
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of a
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, that individual's sole
right after the remarriage to further payments of compensation shall be the right to receive in a lump s u m the
lesser of:
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation payments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of the injury
from which death resulted; or
(ii) an amount equal to 52 weeks of compensation
at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse
was receiving at the time of such remarriage.
(b) (i) If there are other dependents remaining at the
time of remarriage, benefits payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act,
shall be paid to such person as an administrative law
judge may determine, for the use and benefit of the
other dependents.
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid under Subsection (6)(b)(i) shall be paid at intervals of not less t h a n
four weeks.
1997
34A-2-415. Increase of a w a r d to children and d e p e n dent s p o u s e — Effect of death, marriage, majority, or t e r m i n a t i o n of d e p e n d e n c y of children — D e a t h , divorce, or r e m a r r i a g e of
spouse.
Xf an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent
spouse or dependent minor child or children, as provided in
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease at:

288
ms provider demographics, Utah
/ices/fees, and references.
Review Determination - Form
5ed by the division to summarize
Iministrative review,
ds - Copies - Form 302" - This
rimant to request a free copy of
ds from a medical provider. This
oy a staff member of the division,
ly approve change of any of the
iblic notice. Carriers may print
ved versions.
1 be used for any discounting or
tions. Lump sums ordered by the
ly attorney fees paid in a single
of any other sum being paid
ly paid under a weekly benefit
ject to the 8% discounting. The
ate and make available a precise
value table based on a 365 day
ices where discount calculations
lized or where the Commission's
available, the following table,
version of the precise table, may
•lating between the stated weeks
unt.
TABLE
X Cumulative =
Discount

Discount $

001475
008076
015343
022538
029663
036719
043706
050626
057478
064264
070984
077639
084229
090756
097221
103623
109963
116243
122463
128623
134724
140767
146752
152680
158552
164368
170129
175835
181488
187087
192633
199219

e paid on each benefit payment
award from the date that payn due and payable at the rate of
of interest calculation, benefits
d payable" as follows:
compensation shall be due and
ys of the date of the accident
i a l compensation shall be due
•xt day following the termination
^ disability. However, where the

289

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS

condition is not fixed for rating purposes, the interest
shall commence from the date the permanent partial
impairment can be medically determined.
3. Permanent partial or permanent total disability
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund or the Uninsured Employers* Fund shall be due
and payable as soon as reasonably practical after #n
order is issued.
R612-1-6. I s s u a n c e of Checks.
A. Any entity issuing compensation checks or drafts
must make those checks/drafts payable directly to the
injured worker and must mail them directly to the
last known mailing address of the injured worker,
with the following exceptions:
1. If the employer provides full salary to the injured
worker in return for the worker's compensation benefits, the check may be mailed to the worker at the
place of employment;
2. If the employer coordinates other benefits with
the worker's compensation benefits, the check may be
mailed to the worker at the place of employment.
B In no case may the check be made out to the
employer.
C. Where attorney fees are involved, a separate
check should be issued to the worker's attorney in the
amount approved or ordered by the Commission,
unless otherwise directed by the Commission. Payment of the worker's attorney by issuing a check
payable to the worker and his attorney jointly constitutes a violation of this rule.
"R612-1-T. AcceptanceJDenia\ of a Claim.
A. Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier or self-insured
employer shall promptly investigate the claim and
begin payment of compensation" within 21 days from
the date of notification of a valid claim or the insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the
claimant and the division written notice on a division
form or letter containing similar information, within
21 days of notification, that further investigation is
needed stating the reason(s) for further investigation.
Each insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall
complete its investigation within 45 days of receipt of
the claim and shall commence the payment of benefits
or notify the claimant and division in writing that the
claim is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is
being denied.
B. The payment of compensation shall be considered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid claim
or within the 45 days of investigation unless denied.
C. Failure to make payment or to deny a claim
within the 45 day time period without good cause
shall result in a referral of the insurance company to
the Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary action and may be cause for revocation of the
self-insurance certification for a self-insured employer Good cause is defined as:
1. Failure by an employee claiming benefits to sign
requested medical releases;
2. Injury or occupational disease did not occur
within the scope of employment;
3. Medical information does not support the claim;
4. Claim was not filed within the statute of limitations;
5 Claimant is not an employee of the employer
he/she is making a claim against;
6 Claimant has failed to cooperate in the investigation of the claim;
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7. A pre-existing condition is the sole cause of the
medical problem and not the claimed work-related
injury or occupational disease;
8. Tested positive for drugs or alcohol; or
9. Other - a very specific reason must be given.
D. If an insurance carrier or self-insured employer
so as to process the claim in a timely fashion, a later
denial of benefits based on newly discovered information may be allowed.
R612-1-8. Insurance Carrier/Employer Liability.
A. This rule governs responsibility for payment of
workers' compensation benefits for industrial accidents when:
1. The worker's ultimate entitlement to benefits is
not in dispute; but
2. There is a dispute between self-insured employers and/or insurers regarding their respective liability
for the injured worker's benefits arising out of separate industrial accidents which are compensable under Utah law.
B. In cases meeting the criteria of subsection A, the
self-insured employer or insurer providing workers'
compensation coverage for the most recent compensable injury shall advance workers' compensation benefits to the injured worker. The benefits advanced
shall be limited to medical benefits and temporary
total disability compensation. The benefits advanced
shall be paid according to the entitlement in effect on
the date of the earliest related injury.
1 The self-insured employer or insurance carrier
advancing benefits shall notify the non-advancing
party(s) within the time periods as specified in rule
R612-1-7, that benefits are to be advanced pursuant to
this rule.
2. The self-insured employers or insurers not advancing benefits, upon notification from the advancing party, shall notify the advancing party within 10
working days of any potential defenses or limitations
of the non-advancing party(s) liability.
C. The parties are encouraged to settle liabilities
pursuant to this rule, however, any party may file a
request for agency action with the Commission for
determination of liability for the workers' compensation benefits a t issue.
D. The medical utilization decisions of the selfinsured employer or insurer advancing benefits pursuant to this rule shall be presumed reasonable with
respect to the issue of reimbursement.
R612-1-9. Compensation A g r e e m e n t s .
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may enter into a compensation agreement for
the purpose of resolving a worker's compensation
claim. Compensation agreements must be approved
by the Commission. The compensation agreement
must be that contained on Form 019 of the Commission forms and shall include the following information 1 Signatures of the parties involved*,
2 Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury;
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating;
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement.
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and forms may result in the return of the compensation agreement to the carrier or self-insured
employer without approval.
R612-1-10. P e r m a n e n t Total Disability.
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total
disability compensation under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
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1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease prior to
May 1, 1995.
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease on or after
May 1, 1995.
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or
after July 1, 1988 and prior to May 1, 1995, the
Commission is required under Section 34A-2-413, to
make a finding of total disability as measured by the
substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, amended April 1,
1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential
decision-making process" is deemed to confer some
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of
discretion in making its findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement
t h a t a finding by the Commission in permanent and
total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation
has been accomplished.
1. In the event that tlje Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process of
making, a determination of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf.
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the
injured worker has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a
significant cause of the disability is the claimant's
industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total
disability the Commission incorporates the rules of
disability determination in 20 CFR 404.1520,
amended April 1, 1993. The sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions
and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short,
these are:
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful
activity?
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the
duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended
April 1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993?
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
doing past relevant work?
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
doing any other work?
4. After the Commission has made a tentative
finding of permanent total disability:
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, t h e
Commission shall order initiation of payment of permanent total disability compensation;
b. the Commission shall review a summary
of
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the
Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act, as well as
any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier; and
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission
shall hold a hearing to consider the possibility of
rehabilitation and reemployment of the claimant
pending final adjudication of the claim.
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the
parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding
or denying permanent total disability based upon the
preponderance of the evidence and with due consider-
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ation of the vocational factors in combination with the
residual functional capacity which the commission
incorporates as published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P
Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993.
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on
or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a
two-step adjudicative process. First, the Commission
m u s t make a preliminary determination whether the
applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so,
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in
which the Commission will determine whether the
applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On receipt of an application for
permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudication Division will assign an Administrative Law
Judge to conduct evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet
each of the elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2413(l)(b) and (c).
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(l)(b) and
(c), the ALJ will issue a preliminary determination of
permanent total disability and shall order the employer or insurance carrier to pay permanent total
disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the second step of the adjudication process.
The payment of permanent total disability compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination shall
commence as of the date established by the preliminary determination and shall continue until otherwise ordered.
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary
determination may obtain additional agency review
by either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-80K3). If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's preliminary determination
is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board, no further adjudicative or enforcement
proceedings shall take place pending the decision of
the Commissioner or Board.
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total
disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals
Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate
judicial review.
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the Appeals Board or an appellate court, an
appeal of the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's
preliminary determination of permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of "second step"
proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent
total disability compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination.
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant
a request for stay if the requesting party has filed a
petition for judicial review and the Commissioner or
Appeals Board determine that:
(i) the requesting party has a substantia/ possibility
of prevailing on the merits;
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable
injury unless a stay is granted; and
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to
other parties to the proceeding.
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation:
Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413(6), if the first step
of the adjudicatory process results in a preliminary
finding of permanent total disability, an additional
inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be
reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive
such additional proceedings.
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(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether
the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
(i) As p a r t of the hearing, the ALJ will review a
summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a
reemployment plan meeting the requirements set
forth in Subsection 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-413(6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(b) P u r s u a n t to Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b) the employer or insurance carrier may not be required to pay
disability compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate.
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may
be recouped by the employer or insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject to the provisions of Subsection
34A-2-413(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above,
but can be funded by reasonably offsetting the advance of disability compensation against future liability normally paid after the initial 312 weeks.
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation
to provide for an employee's subsistence during the
rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of
future weekly disability compensation payments may
be discounted from the future to the present to accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, the employer or insurance carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts paid against future liability
payable after the initial 312 weeks. In this process,
care should be exercised to reasonably minimize adverse financial impact on the employee.
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the
reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may
be submitted to an ALJ for determination.
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413C7) and (9) require the
applicant to fully cooperate in any evaluation or
reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in
dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction or
elimination of benefit payments including disability
compensation and subsistence allowance amounts,
consistent with the provisions of Section 34A-2-413(7)
and (9).
(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer
or its insurance carrier to diligently pursue any proffered reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result
in a final award of permanent total disability compensation to the applicant.
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second
step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes t h a t successful
rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a
final order for continuing payment of permanent total
disability compensation. The period for payment of
such compensation shall be commence on the date the
employee became permanently and totally disabled,
as determined by the ALJ.
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible,
the ALJ shall enter a final order to that effect, which
order shall contain such direction to the parties as the
ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary under the particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order shall
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provide for reasonable offset of payments of any
disability compensation t h a t constitute an overpayment under Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b).
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and judicial review provided by law.
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards
and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other provisions of the Act and
rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant
if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance t h a t a
resident of the claimant's community would consider
to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is
within the distance the claimant was traveling to
work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available;
and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the
time of the accident the claimant was earning more
than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning a t the time
of the accident, if the employee was earning less than
the state average weekly wage then in effect.
2. Cooperation: As determined by an administrative
law judge, an employee is not entitled to permanent
total disability compensation or subsistence benefits
unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate
the cooperation of the employee using, but not limited
to, the following factors: attendance, active participation, effort, communication with the plan coordinator,
and compliance with the requirements of the vocational plan. In determining if these factors were met,
the ALJ shall consider relevant changes in the employee's documents medical condition.
3. Diligent Pursuit: The employer or its insurance
carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment
plan. The ALJ will evaluate the employer or insurance
carrier's diligent pursuit of the plan using, but not
limited to, the following factors: timely payment of
expenses and benefits outline in the vocational plan,
and as required by the educational institution providing the vocational training, communication with the
employee, compliance with the requirements of the
vocational plan, and timely modification of the plan as
required by documented changes in the employee's
medical condition.
4. Resolution of disputes regarding "cooperation"
and "diligent pursuit": If a party believes another
party is not cooperating with or diligently pursing
either the evaluations necessary to establish a plan,
or the requirements of an approved reemployment or
rehabilitation plan, the aggrieved party shall submit
to the workers' compensation mediation unit an outline of the specific instances of non-cooperation or lack
of diligence. Other parties may submit a reply. The
Mediation Unit will promptly schedule mediation to
reestablish cooperation among the parties necessary
to evaluate or comply with the plan. If mediation is
unsuccessful, a party may request the Adjudication
Division resolve the dispute. The Adjudication Division will conduct a hearing on the matter within 30
days and shall issue a written decision with 10 days
thereafter.
R612-1-11. Burial Expenses.
(1) Pursuant to Section 34A-2-418 if death results
from an industrial injury or occupational disease,
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HEARING:

Old Historic Courtroom 97 East St. George Blvd. St. George, Utafi, on
May 13, 2002, at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, was present and represented by his attorney
Virginius Dabney.
The respondents were represented by attorney Henry K. Chai II.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, filed an "Application For Hearing" with the Utah Labor
Commission on June 5, 2001, and claimed entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation. Mr. DeMille's claim for workers' compensation benefits derived from a low back
injury he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995.
The respondents claimed that the September 14,1995 industrial injury did not cause Mr. DeMille
to become permanently and totally disabled. The respondents argued that Mr. DeMille suffered
no permanent impairment as a result of the September 14,1995 industrial accident beyond that
already endured by Mr. DeMille prior to the September 14, 1995 event.
II, ISSUE.
Did the September 14 1995 industrial accident cause Kirk DeMille to become permanently and
totally disabled?
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III, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation derived from a low back injury
he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995. Mr. DeMille had significant low
back problems prior to September 15,1995.
On August 7, 1987 Judge Richard Sumsion entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order in Case No. 86000508 Kirk DeMille v. Granger-Hunter Improvement District (hereinafter
the 1987 Order). Case No. 86000508 involved a low back injury Mr. DeMille suffered when he
attempted to open a fire hydrant valve with an oversized pipe wrench while employed with the
Granger-Hunter Improvement District on March 7, 1986.
In his 1987 Order Judge Sumsion held that Mr. DeMille sustained a 12.75% whole person
impairment as a result of low back problems that preexisted the March 7, 1986 industrial
accident. Judge Sumsion further found that Mr. DeMille sustained a 4.25% whole person
impairment from the March 7, 1986 low back injury. In sum, as of March 7, 1986 Mr. DeMille
endured a 17% whole person impairment consequent to low back problems.1
On August 8, 1997 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order in Case No. 96920 Kirk DeMille v. Thurston Cable Construction et al (hereinafter the
1997 Order). Case No. 96920 involved the same industrial accident and injury as the present
case. Judge Sims found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left
leg when he fell off a front-end loader. Judge Sims determined that Mr. DeMille5 s September
14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Thurston Cable
Construction (Thurston).2
On November 9, 2000 Mr. DeMille filed an action principally concerned with his claim for
additional temporary total disability compensation. On March 16, 2001 I denied a belated
motion by Mr. DeMille to amend his claim for the inclusion of permanent total disability. On
June 5, 2001, Mr. DeMille filed the present Application for Hearing on the issue of permanent
total disability

1

See also: November 10, 1987 Order Granting Motion for Review (this order only dealt
with the issue concerning the medical necessity of surgery and in all other respects affirmed
Judge Sumsion's 1987 Order). See also: January 19, 1989 Order for Reimbursement from the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
2

The Employers' First Report of Injury noted that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille
fell six feet from a Michigan Loader and landed on his left leg and back.
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On January 2,2002 I entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order with respect to
Mr. DeMille's claim for additional temporary total disability compensation related to the
September 14, 1995 industrial accident with Thurston, [the January 2, 2002 Order]. In the
January 2, 2002 Order I held that Both Mr. DeMille's treating physicians, Dr. Home and Dr.
Hagen, opined that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope for improvement. The
opinions of Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen categorized Mr. DeMille as permanently totally disabled
which, as a matter of law precluded an award of ongoing temporary total disability benefits.
At the hearing on May 13, 20021 accepted into evidence Exhibit's "P-l," "P-2," and Volume 3
of the Medical Exhibit accepted in the prior proceeding as Exhibit "J-1." 3 On August 22,2002,
some three months after the close of evidence in this case, Mr. DeMille, through his attorney Mr.
Dabney, attempted to submit some additional medical records into evidence. The respondents
objected to the submission of the additional medical records. I hereby disallow the submission of
the additional medical recordsfiledby Mr. DeMille August 22, 2002 and give them no further
consideration.
IV- FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Prior Orders.

To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt thefindingsset
forth in the 1997 Order and the January 2, 2002 Order.
B.

Employment

The 1997 Order established that Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995.
C

Compensation Rate.

The 1997 Order found that on September 14,1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three
dependent children. The 1997 Order established that on September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's
compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40 hours per week, for an average weekly
wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages determined by the 1997 Order confirmed
$335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for the
September 14,1995 injury.

3

At the hearing on April 3, 2001 the parties agreed to remove pages 53-58fromVolume I
of Exhibit "J-L" At the hearing on May 13, 2002 I sustained objections to the admissibility of
Exhibit's "P-3W and "P-4" into evidence.
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D.

Prior Low Back Injuries,

As discussed infra, Mr. DeMiile suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries
prior to the September 14, 1995 industrial accident.
E.

The September 14,1995 Industrial Injury.

The 1997 Order found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMiile injured his low back and left leg
when he fell off a front-end loader. Mr. DeMiile's September 14,1995 injury arose out of and in
the course of his employment with Thurston. For the sake of clarity, I repeat some of the facts
set forth in January 2, 2002 Order.
On September 21, 1995 Dr. Jonathan Home M.D. diagnosed Mr. DeMiile with:
1.
2.
3.

Radiculopathy left leg L5 nerve root.
Solid fusion L4-L5 vertebra with retained internal hardware two AD
screws and cerclage wire.4
New strain/sprain contusion lumbosacral spine possible disc herniation.
[Exhibit " J - r Vol. II p. 294].

On September 28,1995 a Lumbar Myelogram and Post Myelogram CT performed by Dr. Steven
Davis M.D. disclosed:
|
The post myleogram CT images demonstrate again the post operative changes
with solid appearing bone graft material posterolateral extending from L4 through
SI. There is a very small central herniated nucleus pulposus at L5-S1 which
indents the thecal sac but does not compress adjacent nerve roots. The remaining
levels are unremarkable, [id. at 82].
On October 4,1995 Dr. Home observed that:
The myelogram and CT scan did not help us very much, it didn't show anything
new. [id. at 297].

4

Mr. DeMille's fusion occurred prior to his September 14,1995 industrial accident.
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On October 17, 1995 Dr. Home removed the hardware from Mr. DeMille's prior lumbar fusion
which involved:
1.
2.
3.

Exploration of lumbar spine fusion of L4-L5.
Removal of two screws, two washers, HO type, and removal of cerclage
wire.
Saucerization of metallurgical osteitis, [id. at Vol. III].

On January 19,1996 Dr. John Davis took flexion and extension view x-rays of Mr. DeMille's
lumbar spine which revealed:
Post surgical changes lower lumbar spine. Associated degenerative changes lower
lumbar spine. Facet joint narrowing L3-4 and L5-S1 is moderate. Severe
narrowing L4-5 Facet may be post surgical in nature, [id. Vol. I at 83].
The respondents assembled a medical panel composed of Dr. Gerald Moress M.D., neurologist,
Dr. Boyd Holbrook M.D., orthopedic surgeon and, Dr. Robert Burgoyne M.D., a psychiatrist.
On March 10, 1996 the respondents' medical panel concluded:
The panel doubts that there is any underlying physical problem other than the pain
disorder that Mr. DeMille shows. The panel felt the pain disorder was not related
to the industrial incident5 but was characterological and related to events that preexisted the industrial incident. We were unable to see any residual from the
industrial incident, [id. Vol. II at 391].
On November 13, 1996 Dr. Home noted:
An electromyogram and EMG was performed which showed positive
radiculopathy, which is 100% evidence of continued problems with the nerve root
components for the left sciatic nerve, which have been part of the patient's
problem all along, [id. Vol. II at 313].

5

The September 14, 1995 industrial accident.
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Judge Sims appointed a medical panel that consisted of Dr. Madison Thomas M.D., neurologist
and, Dr. Glen Momberger M.D., orthopedic surgeon. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission
medical panel concluded:
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol.
II at 440].
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the report of the medical panel and found that on
September 14,1995 Mr. DeMille in fact injured his low back and left leg when he fell off the
front-end loader.
On April 28,1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal
epidural dorsal column stimulator." [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr.
DeMille endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol I.
it 12,24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204,206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home
emoved the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that:
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE
INSURANCE COMPANY6 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE,
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. II
at 332].
The respondents assembled a second medical panel composed of neurologists Dr. Moress and Dr.
Scott Knorp. [id. Vol. II at 400]. On October 26, 1999 the respondents' second medical panel
essentially corroborated the conclusions reached bv the respondent's first medical panel, [id. at
400-402].
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home concluded:
He has continued severe low back and left leg pain with radiculopathy
arachnoiditis, perispinal scarring from infection, soft tissue scarring in muscles
and supporting tissues of the back. [id. Vol. II at 359].
6

Respondent Freemont Comp.
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Judge Sims' 1997 Order conclusively confirmed that the 1995 industrial accident caused Mr.
DeMille some serious back and left leg problems contrary to the opinions rendered by the
respondents' medical panels. In the January 2, 2002 Order I found that:
[t]he preponderance of the medical evidence established that Mr. DeMille
suffered ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy in part due to
permanent aggravations caused by the 1995 accident. The undisputed medical
evidence in this case verified that Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal, soft
tissue damage from infections accompanying the stimulator implant. No dispute
existed that Freemont Comp's requirement of a two stage procedure for the
stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the
stimulator.
F.

Permanent Total Disability.
1.

Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14,1995 Industrial
Accident

The respondents correctly observed that Mr. DeMille suffered from a 17% whole person
impairment due to low back problems that pre-dated the September 14, 1995 industrial accident
in the present case. The respondents then noted that Mr. DeMille received no additional
impairment rating for the additional injuries caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial
accident. Because nobody assigned a percentage of impairment to Mr. DeMille's injuries caused
by the September 14, 1995 industrial accident, the respondents argued he did not suffer a
significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995).
The respondents overlooked several important conclusions contained in the determinative
medical evidence in this case. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission Medical Panel
concluded:
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol.
II at 440].
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the findings of the Medical Panel which became the
controlling medical evidence in this case. I in turn adopted Judge Sims findings in my January 2,
2002 Order.
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My January 2, 2002 Order also recounted the respondents responsibility for the infections and six
surgical procedures endured by Mr. DeMille related to his dorsal column stimulator. On April
28, 1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal epidural
dorsal column stimulator." [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr. DeMille
endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol. I. at 12,
24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204, 206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home removed
the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that:
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE
INSURANCE COMPANY7 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE,
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. II
at 332].
Following the infections associated with the spinal cord stimulator, his treating physicians
rendered a series of opinions concerning Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability caused by the
September 14, 1995 industrial injury. On June 21, 1999 Dr. Home stated:
My opinion is he may very likely be as good as he's going to get.
He's certainly disabled and can do very little if anything. He can hardly sit in a
car for a few minutes, can't sit up around the house for longer than Yi hour or an
hour without laying back down. He's not capable of any type of gainful
employment and I see no light at the end of the tunnel that's going to change this.
[id. Vol II at 346i][emphasis added].
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home stated:
S.S. has determined that he is totally disabled with which I agree. ri nere is no way
that he could sit/walk/be driven to a job or functionally be able to perform even a
sedentary job for a predictable time of even forty hours. Any of this would
aggravate his condition, [id. Vol. II at 359-360].

7

Respondent Freemont Comp.
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On March 29, 2001 Dr. Home opined that:
The patient absolutely is not going to improve. He may become and probably will
become progressively more severe, [id. Vol. II at 360B].
He is totally disabled, is unable to sit, stand, walk for more than just a few
minutes at a time, and has significantly increases of pain in performing those
small intervals of activity. He uses a cane even to move around the home...At the
very most, he's able to walk with a cane 2-3 blocks in extreme circumstances...In
extreme circumstances, he can stand for 20-30 minutes, or sit for 45 to 90 minutes
such as on some car rides or even going to a doctor's office, [id. Vol. II at
3 60C] [emphasis added]
On April 24, 2001 Dr. Jerold Hagen M.D. opined regarding Mr. DeMille:
He has been unable to work or engage in any activity. He cannot sit for any length
of time nor can he walk for any distance.
[M]r. DeMille is a patient who's life has been totally changed since 1998 and has
been unable to work or perform any meaningful activity....// is doubtful to me that
the patient will ever be able to hold down a meaningful job unless some resolution
can be found for his incessant pain. [id. Vol. Ill at 456] [emphasis added].
Both Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen professed that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope
for improvement. The controlling findings of the June 19,1997 Labor Commission Medical
Panel determined that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a
"significant injury," and "produced a significant aggravation" of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low
back problems, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The Labor Commission Medical Panel also concluded that
but for Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, he "likely (would) have continued
relatively asymptomatic for an indefinite period." [id.].
Dr. Home maintained that decisions made by respondents concerning Mr. DeMille's dorsal
column stimulator resulted in his ten month course of hospitalizations, six surgical interventions,
and much of the current problems suffered by Mr. DeMille. [id. Vol. II at 332]. Dr. Hagen
opined that inter alia the resultant complications caused by the infections from dorsal column
stimulator eventually led to Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability.
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In summary, the established facts in this case revealed that between 1987, and September 14,
1995, Mr. DeMille remained relatively asymptomatic and able to work. The determinative facts
of this case confirmed that but for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he
likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period.
The established facts of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial
accident itself constituted a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr.
DeMille's preexisting low back problems. Further, the conclusive evidence in this case disclosed
that the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in serious, permanent
exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems. While not given a percentage impairment rating,
Mr. DeMille's low back problems caused by the September 14,1995 industrial accident took him
from employ ability with a preexisting 17% whole person impairment to permanent total
disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injuries caused a significant
impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995),
2.

Permanent Total Disability.
a.

Gainful Employment.

Sometime after the September 14,1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille worked for three
months as a sales clerk at Hurst Sporting Goods (Hurst). Mr. DeMille terminated his
employment with Hurst because of back pain.
After the September 14,1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille also worked for six months with
Danny Bundy Construction Company (Danny Bundy). Again, Mr. DeMille stopped working
with Danny Bundy because of his back problems. Mr. DeMille held no gainful employment
since his job with Danny Bundy. At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille
remained unemployed.
b.

Ability to do Basic Work Activities.

As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities.
c.

Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995.

As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that
Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work
activities.
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d.

Other Work Reasonably Available.

As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities.
e.

Conclusion.

As set forth in Section IV.F. 1. infra, the established-medical evidence in this case contirmed Mr.
DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr.
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting
injuries that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled.
3.

Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability.

As cited multiple times herein, the opinion of the 1997 Labor Commission Medical Panel
constituted the conclusive medical opinion as adopted by Judge Sims' 1997 Order and my own
January 2, 2002 Order. The 1997 Labor Commission Medical panel determined that but for Mr.
DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively
asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The established facts
of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted
a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low
back problems, [id.]. Further, the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care
resulted in serious exacerbations of the problems caused by the September 14,1995 industrial
accident, [id. Vol. II at 332, and Vol. HI. at 456]. In sum, the determinative medical evidence in
this case established that Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, and the
respondents medaling in his medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations
to preexisting problems that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled,
4.

Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. DeMille worked for nine months after his September 14, 1995 industrial accident, [see:
Section IV.F.2.a.]. Thereafter, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed, and permanently, totally
disabled. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case established the
commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability at June 15,1996.
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V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Prior Orders.

To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt the conclusions of
law set forth in the 1997 Order, and the January 2, 2002 Order.
B.

Employment

Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995.
C.

Compensation Rate.

On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three dependent children. Further, on
September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40
hours per week, for an average weekly wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages
established $335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for
the September 14, 1995 injury.
D.

Prior Low Back Injuries.

Mr. DeMille suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries prior to the
September 14,1995 industrial accident.
E.

The September 14,1995 Industrial Injury.

On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left leg when he fell off a frontend loader. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment with Thurston.
The 1995 industrial accident caused Mr. DeMille serious back problems. Mr. DeMille suffered
ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy due to permanent aggravations caused by the
1995 accident. Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal, soft tissue damage from infections
accompanying the stimulator implant. Freemont Comp's requirement of a two stage procedure
for the stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the
stimulator.8
As stated by professor Larson: "It is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary
injury by medical or surgical treatment is compensable." A. LARSON and L. LARSON, LARSON'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 10.09 [1] (2002). See also: Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial
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F.

Permanent Total Disability.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1) (1995) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section:
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that:
(i) The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) The employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of
the employees permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis of
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available taking
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,,
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.

Comm'n. 73 Utah 535,275 P. 777 (1929).
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1.

Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14,1995 Industrial
Accident

Between 1987, and September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille's preexisting low back problems remained
relatively asymptomatic and he was able to work. But for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995
industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for
an indefinite period. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a
significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low back
problems. Further, the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in
serious, permanent exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems.
While not given a percentage impairment rating, Mr. DeMille's low back problems caused by the
September 14, 1995 industrial accident took him from employability with a preexisting 17%
whole person impairment to permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMille's September 14,
1995 injuries caused a significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67
(l)(b)(i)(1995). 9
2.

Permanent Total Disability.
a.

Gainful Employment.

At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed.
b.

Ability to do Basic Work Activities.

Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities.
c.

Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995.

Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work
activities.

9

Respondents' argument that a finding of "significant impairment" requires a rated
impairment would lead to the unnecessary exercise of obtaining impairment ratings for all
injuries causing permanent total disability regardless of the seriousness or nature of the injury.
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d.

Other Work Reasonably Available.

Mr. ueivnne remained unable to do any type of work activities.
e

< " i 11' il in, "III in i in "ni in in.

Mr. DeMille's September it, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr.
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting
injuries that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled.
3.

Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability.

Mi. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in his
medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting injuries that
left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled.
I.

Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability.

The commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability is June 15, 1996.
VI. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or
Freemont Comp. shall pay Kirk DeMille subsistence payments in the amount of $335.00 per
week as of the date of this order and ongoing until further order of the Labor Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (6)(b) (1995). Further benefits to be determined after
accomplishment of the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann §35-1-67 (6)(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or
Freemont Comp. shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Kirk DeMille's back
injuries incurred on September 14, 1995, according to the medical and surgical fee schedule of
the Utah Labor Commission. The respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or Freemont
Comp. shall also pay travel allowances plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the respondents intend to submit a reemployment plan, the
respondents shall file notice of such intent within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. The
respondents shall file the reemployment plan within thirty (30) days after filing the notice of
intent to file the plan, or within (60) days of the date of this order.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by separate notice hearing shall be set with respect to any
reemployment plan submitted by respondents.
Dated this 6th day of November 2002,

chard M. La Jeunesse
dministrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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Case No. 00-1059

All parties ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's
decision regarding Kirk S. Demille's claim for permanent total disability compensation benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.)
I he Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
On September 14,1995, Mr. DeMille was injured in an accident while working for Thurston
Cable. He now seeks permanent total disability compensation from Thurston Cable and its workers'
compensation insurance carrier, Freemont Comp. (referred to jointly as "Thurston" hereafter). After
an evidentiary hearing, Judge La Jeunesse concluded Mr. DeMille was entitled to a preliminary
finding of permanent total disability, subject to further proceedings to determine whether he can be
reemployed or rehabilitated. Judge LaJeunesse ordered Thurston to begin paying subsistence
benefits to Mr. DeMille as of November 6, 2002, the date of Judge La Jeunesse's decision.
Thurston requests Commission review of Judge LaJeunesse's decision on the grounds that:
i J Mi. DeMille did not sustain a "significant impairment" from his accident at Thurston; and, 2) the
accident was not the direct cause of his permanent total disability. For his part, Mr. DeMille asks
the Commission to review the date on which subsistence benefits should commence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in Judge La Jeunesse's decision. As
material to the issues raised by the parties' motions for review, the facts are summarized below.
At the time Mr. DeMille began working for Thurston, he had a 17% whole person
impairment from prior back injuries. Nevertheless, he was able to perform his work duties at
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Thurston and remain gainfully employed. Then, on September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille tell ott a
front-end loader at Thurston. This accident significantly aggravated his preexisting back problems.
He underwent back surgeries to treat his injuries, but developed a serious infection as a complication
of the surgeries. The infection required even more medical care and, eventually, more surgery. All
told, Mr. DeMille spent ten months in the hospital and had a total of six surgeries. As a result of
all this, Mr. DeMille now has scarring in his spine, muscle and soft tissue of his back. Mr. DeMille
is unable to sit, stand, or walk for more than a few minutes at a time. He cannot work or engage in
any significant physical activity. His condition will not improve and will probably deteriorate.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
There is no question that Mr. DeMille injured his back in a work-related accident at Thurston
on September 14, 1995. Consequently, his injuries are compensable under the Utah workers'
compensation system. See §34A-2-401 of the Act. However, in order to receive the specific benefit
of permanent total disability compensation, Mr. DeMille must satisfy the conditions set forth in
§34A-2-413 of the Act. Thurston argues that Mr. DeMille has failed to meet two of those
conditions.
First, Thurston contends that Mr. DeMille has not met §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)'s requirement
of a "significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident.
. . that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement.)" Section 34A-2-102(8) defines
"impairment" as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or function abnormality or
loss." Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston on September 14, 1005, and the medical treatment he
received as a result of the accident, produced scarring in muscle, spine and soft tissue, resulting in
both anatomical and functional abnormality and loss. Thus, the record establishes that Mr. DeMille
sustained an "impairment" within the meaning of the Act as a result of his accident at Thurston.
The Commission notes Thurston's argument that Mr. DeMille's impairment cannot be
considered significant because it has never been rated by a physician. While such a rating would
have been helpful in this case, and might be essential in other cases, §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) only
requires a "significant impairment," not a "significant impairment rating." In light of the facts and
medical opinion submitted in this case, the Commission agrees with Judge LaJeunesse that Mr.
DeMille has established a significant impairment.
Thurston's second argument is that Mr. DeMille tailed to meet §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)'s
requirement that "the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total
disability." In considering this argument, the Commission notes Mr. DeMille was able to work prior
to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident the resulting injuries and consequences of medical
treatment left him unable to work, except for relatively short and unsuccessful efforts to rejoin the
workforce. Mr. DeMille's inability to work as a result of the Thurston accident is confirmed by the
medical evidence. Thus, Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston is the direct cause of his permanent
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total disability.
Although Thurston cites the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision in McKesson v.
Lieberrnan, 41 P3d 468 (Utah App. 2002) to support its argument, McKesson involved a non-work
aggravation of a work-related injury. The Court of Appeals' analysis of that situation is not
applicable to a case such as this, where there have been two separate work accidents, the last of
which removes the worker from the workforce.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. DeMille has satisfied the
requirements of §34A-2-413(l)(b), including subparts (i) and (iii). He is therefore entitled to a
tentative determination of permanent total disability
The Commission now turns to Mr. DeMille's contention that he should receive retroactive
subsistence benefits. As pointed out by Thurston, the Commission has addressed this issue before.
The Commission has consistently held that, because the Act itself does not specify when the
subsistence payments should begin, that question must be decided on a case by case basis by the
ALJ, subject to review by the Commission or Appeals Board. In this case, the Commission finds
no basis to disturb Judge LaJeunesse's order that Thurston begin payment of subsistence benefits
to Mr DeMille as of November 6,2002.
Finally, Mr. DeMille contends that Judge LaJeunesse neglected to provide tor payment ot
attorneys fees to Mr. DeMille's counsel. Because the Commission remands this matter to Judge
LaJeunesse for additional proceedings, the Commission instructs Judge LaJeunesse to consider and
rule upon this question of attorneys fees.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge LaJeunesse's decision in this matter and denies the motions
for review of Thurston and Mr. DeMille. The Commission remands this matter to Judge LaJeunesse
to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation and
also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. DeMille's counsel. It is so ordered.
Dated this jffiday of May, 2003.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
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